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INTRODUCTION 
Today, cell phones are almost ubiquitous: much of the 
population uses and carries them daily.1  Of course, this 
means criminals can use cell phones to facilitate their 
criminal enterprises.2  Law enforcement, in turn, has adopted 
methods to effectively exploit cell phone  usage data for 
surveillance purposes. 
One such method is better known: compelling cell service 
providers, by court order, to pass along data stored by their 
cell towers.  Known as cell site tracking, this data can be used 
to track a phone’s past or present location.3  Debate has raged 
over whether cell site tracking implicates the Fourth 
Amendment, and courts that have taken up the subject have 
come to different conclusions.4 
Far less attention has been paid to another method of cell 
phone tracking: the use of cell site simulators, or “Stingrays.”  
Despite their rising use, and the equal implications to the 
Fourth Amendment, little open debate surrounds the 
Stingray device.  As of September 2015, no federal appellate 
court has taken up the issue.  Yet, as Stringrays become 
better known and more widely used, the judiciary might play 
a greater role in regulating its use. 
This Comment analyzes the Fourth Amendment 
implications of police use of the Stingray device.  In 
comparing the Stingray device to traditional cell site 
tracking, this Comment highlights the differences between 
the two methods of cell phone tracking and argues that the 
use of Stingrays should be subject to a higher standard. 
Part II of this Comment discusses the current legal 
 
 1. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014). 
 2. See id. at 2493. 
 3. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 4. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
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framework of cell site tracking.  Part II.A discusses the 
statutory foundation the government uses to authorize cell 
site tracking.  Part II.B analyzes the Supreme Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence relevant to the debate about cell 
site tracking, including two relatively recent decisions that 
may have a greater impact.  Part II.C presents two federal 
appellate court decisions analyzing cell site tracking, both 
reaching different conclusions about its Fourth Amendment 
implications.  Part II.D introduces the Stingray device and 
discusses both the technology behind the device and the 
current authority the device operates under. 
Part III of this Comment outlines the problems arising 
from the current legal treatment of the Stingray device.  Part 
IV discusses the differences between the Stingray and 
traditional cell site tracking and why these differences 
warrant different legal treatment for the Stingray device.  
Finally, Part V proposes that requiring a probable cause 
warrant before a Stingray device can be used adequately 
balances privacy concerns with those of law enforcement. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Cell-Site Location Information 
1. Definition 
Cell phones operate by periodically sending out signals, 
or “pings” to nearby cell towers.5  These signals allow the 
phone to determine which cell towers to route incoming and 
outgoing calls through in order to receive the best reception.6  
In the process, the phone is constantly relaying its location to 
the nearest cell tower.7  Every phone has a Mobile 
Identification Number (MIN)—the number that another user 
must dial to reach the phone—and a unique Electronic Serial 
Number (ESN) assigned by the manufacturer.8 A cell phone 
 
 5.  William Curtiss, Article, Triggering a Closer Review: Direct Acquisition 
of Cell Site Location Tracking Information and the Argument for Consistency 
Across Statutory Regimes, 45 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 139, 144. (2011). 
 6.  See In re Application of the United States for Order for Prospective Cell 
Site Location Info., 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 7. Id. at 450. 
 8. Curtiss, supra note 5, at 165. 
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“registers” to a cellular network by relaying its MIN and ESN 
to nearby cell towers, giving preference to the tower with the 
strongest signal.9  As the phone moves, it will continually 
rank the signal strength of nearby cell towers from strongest 
to weakest.10  This information can reveal where the phone 
was located at the time of a call11 and is known as cell-site 
location information (CSLI). 
Cell service providers use CSLI to locate the phone 
within the cell network when it receives a call.12  Providers 
generally store CSLI, as it is useful information.13  The 
amount of CSLI stored and how long it is kept varies across 
providers, but almost all providers store accurate location 
information of its users.14 
2. Statutory Authority 
The statutory authority for the use of CSLI is drawn 
mainly from the Stored Communications Act (“the SCA”)15 
and the Pen/Trap statute,16 both part of the larger Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act.17  The main hurdle faced by the 
government in its use and acquisition of CSLI is Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 41 (“Fed. Cr. Rule 41”),18 which 
requires a warrant based on probable cause for the use of 
“tracking devices.”19  This burden—probable cause—is higher 
than the burden required under the SCA or Pen/Trap 
Statute./  To bypass Fed. Cr. Rule 41, the government uses a 
combination of the SCA and the Pen/Trap statute to argue 
 
 9. Curtiss, supra note 5, at 165. 
 10. In re Application of the United States for Order for Prospective Cell Site 
Location Info., 460 F. Supp. 2d at 451. 
 11. Because cell phones register with multiple cell towers with any given 
signal, the varying signal strengths can be used to “triangulate” the location of 
the phone.  See id. at 451. 
 12. Id. 
 13. For example, providers use location information to determine when 
roaming charges apply, and to track the volume of cell phone calls in a given 
area.  See id. 
 14. See id. 
 15. 18 U.S.C. § 2703–12 (2014). 
 16. 18 U.S.C. § 3121–27 (2014). 
 17. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act was amended by the 
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA). 47 U.S.C. § 
1001–10. 
 18. Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(C). 
 19. Id. 
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that a warrant is not required for the acquisition of CSLI, 
despite its use in tracking individuals.20 
a. Stored Communications Act 
The SCA21 allows a governmental entity to “require a 
provider of electronic communication service or remote 
computing service to disclose a record or other information 
pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service” if 
the government “offers specific and articulable facts showing 
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents 
of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other 
information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing 
criminal investigation.”22 
The government’s position, in arguing that the SCA 
allows for the collection of CSLI, is that such data falls under 
the definition of a “record.”23  Under this interpretation, the 
SCA permits the collection of CSLI pursuant to a court order 
after a showing of Specific and Articulable facts, rather than 
a warrant based on probable cause as required for tracking 
devices. 
b. Pen/Trap Statute 
The Pen/Trap statute24 was enacted in response to a 
Supreme Court decision holding that individuals have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers 
that they dial.25  Following the decision, Congress saw a need 
to protect against the indiscriminate use of surveillance and 
recording devices, and thus enacted the Pen/Trap statute.26  
Under the statute, an application for an order granting the 
use of a pen/trap device27 requires the applicant to certify that 
 
 20. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.c. 
 21. 18 U.S.C. § 2703–12. 
 22. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)–(d).  This standard will be referred to as “Specific 
and Articulable facts.” 
 23. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.c. 
 24. 18 U.S.C. § 3121–27. 
 25. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979). 
 26. Curtiss, supra note 5, at 147. 
 27.  A “pen register” is a device that records the telephone numbers of calls 
made from a particular phone line (i.e., all outgoing numbers).  See 18 U.S.C § 
3127 (3).  Conversely, a “trap/trace” device records all incoming numbers to a 
particular phone line. 18 U.S.C. § 3127 (4). 
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the information sought is reasonably likely to be relevant to 
an ongoing criminal investigation.28  This is a low burden to 
meet, as courts merely rely on the certification itself, not the 
facts supporting it.29 
c. Hybrid Theory 
The government has relied on a combination of the SCA 
and the Pen/Trap statute in order to sidestep Fed. Cr. Rule 
41, thus bypassing the requirement for a warrant for the use 
and acquisition of CSLI.30  The Communications Assistance 
for Law Enforcement Act31 states that information that may 
disclose the physical location of the subscriber cannot be 
acquired solely by use of a Pen/Trap order.32  The government 
interprets this language to mean that a Pen/Trap order, 
combined with the authority from the SCA, is sufficient to 
acquire location information.33  The SCA does allow 
subscriber information to be acquired, albeit on a showing of 
Specific and Articulable facts that the information is likely to 
be relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.34  The 
government’s position is that this heightened standard of 
proof is sufficient to allow the court to grant an order for the 
collection of CSLI.35 
The essence of the Hybrid Theory is that the Pen/Trap 
statute and the SCA together can allow what neither statute 
 
 28. 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2). 
 29. See Curtiss, supra note 5, at 148. 
 30. See id. at 149; See also In re Application of the United States for an 
Order (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & a Trap & Trace Device & (2) 
Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. &/or Cell Site Info., 396 F. Supp. 2d 294 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (analyzing the Hybrid Theory relied upon by the government in 
an application to obtain cell site location information). 
 31. 47 U.S.C. § 1001–10. 
 32. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2) (2014). 
 33. See In re Application of the United States for an Order (1) Authorizing 
the Use of a Pen Register & a Trap & Trace Device & (2) Authorizing Release of 
Subscriber Info. &/or Cell Site Info., 396 F. Supp. 2d at 315 (“The 
government . . . vigorously contends that an application made under the SCA 
and the Pen/Trap Statute together accomplishes what separate applications 
under each statute might not.”) For ease of reference, I will call this argument 
the “Hybrid Theory.” 
 34. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.a. 
 35. See Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. &/or Cell Site Info., 396 F. 
Supp. 2d at 315. 
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can alone: the collection of CSLI.36  But this theory also rests 
on several assumptions and interpretations.37  First, as 
mentioned above, the government interprets CSLI as a 
“record” and is thus governed by the SCA.  Second, any use of 
tracking devices is covered by Fed. Cr. Rule 41, requiring a 
warrant.38  Thus, the government characterizes CSLI as a 
“communication,” requiring less than probable cause.39 
B. Supreme Court and 4th Amendment Protections 
In addition to statutory requirements, the collection of 
CLSI must also meet the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.  The 
Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures,”40 except on a showing of 
probable cause (upon which a warrant is issued).  Below, 
several Fourth Amendment doctrines relevant to the 
discussion of Stingrays and CSLI41 are discussed, as well as 
two relatively recent decisions that are likely to impact the 
debate in the future. 
1. Third Party Doctrine 
The third party doctrine stands for the principle that an 
individual has no expectation of privacy, and thus, no Fourth 
Amendment protection, in information voluntarily disclosed 
to a third party.42  The basis of this doctrine is that the 
individual, in disclosing information to a third party, has 
assumed the risk that the third party might in turn disclose 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 316 (“Although the essence of the hybrid theory is that two 
statutes together accomplish what neither can alone, the argument more 
precisely rests on a complex chain of inferences derived from several different 
legislative enactments . . . .”). 
 38. Fed. R. Crim. P. 41. 
 39. For a more in-depth discussion of various courts’ treatment of the 
Hybrid Theory, see Curtiss, supra note 5, at 149–56. 
 40. U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
 41. While CLSI collection and the use of the Stingray device have many 
parallels, they differ in important ways. See, infra, section III. D. 
 42. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976)(holding 
that a bank depositor has no expectation of privacy in information he 
voluntarily conveyed to banks and their employees). 
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that information to the government.43  An example of this 
doctrine is Smith v. Maryland,44 where the Court held that an 
individual has no expectation of privacy in a telephone 
number voluntarily conveyed to a phone company in order to 
make a call.45 
2. Knotts/Karo and the Public/Private Distinction 
Smith v. Maryland established that an individual has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in outgoing telephone 
numbers that he or she dials.46  But when information is used 
to track an individual’s location, the Supreme Court has 
shown greater concern for privacy.  In 1983 the Supreme 
Court held in United States v. Knotts that an individual “in 
an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to 
another.”47  In 1984—only one year later—the Court 
explained in United States v. Karo that using a tracking 
device to monitor an individual in a private residence would 
violate the Fourth Amendment if not undertaken pursuant to 
a warrant and on a showing of probable cause.48  
Thus, Knotts and Karo draw a distinction between public 
and private places.  Courts generally follow this rule: for 
example, an individual can generally be tracked on public 
streets without a warrant.  However, once tracking begins to 
focus on an individual’s movements in a private place, the 
Fourth Amendment applies, and a warrant is needed.49  The 
problem courts face in the context of CSLI is determining 
exactly when this distinction applies. 
 
 43. Id. at 443. (“The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to 
another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the 
Government.”). 
 44. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 45. Id. at 745–46. 
 46. Id. at 742. 
 47. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983). 
 48. Karo was distinguished from Knotts on the basis that the,police in Karo 
used a GPS device to track a barrel as it moved from a highway to a private 
warehouse, without any accompanying visual surveillance.  It was this shift to 
tracking movement in a “private” area that violated the Fourth Amendment. 
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1984). 
 49. See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511–12 (1961) 
(holding that the use of a surveillance device that penetrated the wall of a 
defendant’s home violated the Fourth Amendment). 
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3. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
A more basic doctrine relating to the collection and use of 
CLSI is the doctrine of a reasonable expectation of privacy.  
This doctrine stands for the proposition that the Fourth 
Amendment protects an individual where he has a subjective 
expectation of privacy in a situation or piece of information, 
and society recognizes the expectation as an objectively 
reasonable one.50  The basic rule was established by Katz v. 
United States.51  There, the Supreme Court analyzed police 
action in recording a conversation taking place within a 
phone booth.52  The Court ultimately held that because the 
defendant, and society at large, would reasonably expect 
privacy in the phone booth, the government intrusion 
required a warrant.53  Thus, under this doctrine, if one has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in a situation or piece of 
information, the Fourth Amendment protects him or her. 
The Court later distinguished this test in Kyllo v. United 
States.54 There, the Court examined police use of thermal 
imaging technology to survey a private residence.55  Applying 
the reasonable expectation of privacy test, the Court held that 
the warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment.56  
Importantly, the Court reasoned in part that the fact that 
technology was not in general public use made a societal 
expectation of privacy more reasonable.57 
4. GPS Trackers: United States v. Jones 
The decision in United States v. Jones58 also carries 
implications for the collection of CLSI.  Jones involved the 
installation of a GPS tracking device by police onto the 
undercarriage of the defendant’s car while it was parked in a 
public parking lot.59  Although the police applied for and was 
granted a warrant to attach the device, the government 
 
 50. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J. Concurring). 
 51. Id. at 350. 
 52. Id. at 354. 
 53. Id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J. concurring). 
 54. Kylio v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 55. Id. at 40. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 59. Id. at 948. 
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admitted that the police did not comply with the terms of the 
warrant.60  Thus, the Court’s analysis treated the use of the 
GPS tracker as warrantless.61 
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that placing the 
GPS on the defendant’s car violated the Fourth 
Amendment.62  The majority opinion, written by Justice 
Scalia, declared that because police physically trespassed on 
defendant’s property to place the tracking device, the Katz 
analysis did not apply.63  Instead, the majority noted that 
historically “the Fourth Amendment was understood to 
embody a particular concern for government trespass upon 
the areas (‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’) it 
enumerates.”64  Because the Fourth Amendment still provides 
protection against physical trespass by the government,65 the 
majority concluded that the police placing the tracking device 
on the defendant’s property violated the Fourth 
Amendment.66 
The two concurrences, however, did discuss the Katz 
analysis. While not binding, these concurrences highlight 
many of the same concerns that are present where police use 
Stingray devices67. Justice Sotomayor wrote separately to 
discuss how Katz would bear on the case.68  Justice 
Sotomayor noted that “physical intrusion is now unnecessary 
to many forms of surveillance,”69 and that “[i]n cases of 
electronic or other novel modes of surveillance that do not 
depend upon a physical invasion on property, the majority 
 
 60. Id. at 948.  The warrant authorized installation of the device within ten 
days and in the District of Columbia, but police attached it eleven days later, in 
Maryland. 
 61. See id. 
 62. Id. at 947, 949, 954. 
 63. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (holding that “Jones’s 
Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation.”). 
 64. Id. 
 65. See id. at 952 (“But as we have discussed, the Katz reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-
law trespassory test.”). 
 66. Id. at 953. 
 67. See infra part III. A for an in depth discussion of the concerns raised by 
the use of Stingrays. 
 68. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). 
 69. Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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opinion’s trespassory test may provide little guidance.”70 
Further, Justice Sotomayor argued that GPS monitoring 
carries unique privacy concerns because it “generates a 
precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public movements 
that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, 
professional, religious, and sexual associations.”71  Because of 
the unique nature of GPS monitoring, Justice Sotomayor 
questioned whether people reasonably expect that the sum of 
their movements in public will be aggregated and analyzed 
extensively by the government.72 
Finally, Justice Sotomayor questioned the applicability of 
the third party rule in the digital age.73  Justice Sotomayor 
reasoned that in today’s digital age, a great deal of personal 
information is disclosed to third parties.74  Justice Sotomayor 
concluded by stating that it should not be assumed that “all 
information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the 
public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, 
disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.”75 
Writing for the second concurrence, Justice Alito stressed 
that the degree of intrusion is what should determine 
whether the Fourth Amendment was violated.76  Justice Alito 
lamented the fact that “the Court’s reliance on the law of 
trespass will present particularly vexing problems in cases 
involving surveillance that is carried out by making 
electronic, as opposed to physical, contact with the item to be 
 
 70. Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 71. Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  The notion that separate, less 
significant pieces of information may be combined to implicate the Fourth 
Amendment is known as the mosaic theory. For a more in-depth discussion and 
criticism of the mosaic theory, see Orin Kerr, Article: The Mosaic Theory of The 
Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311 (2012). 
 72. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (“I would ask whether people reasonably expect that their 
movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the 
Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious 
beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”). 
 73. Id. at 957. (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 74. Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“This approach is ill suited to the digital 
age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to 
third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”). 
 75. Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 76. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 961 (2012) (Alito, J., Concurring) 
(“[T]he Court’s reasoning largely disregards what is really important (the use of 
a GPS for the purpose of long-term tracking) . . . .”). 
BERNSTEIN FINAL 12/21/2015  5:46 PM 
188 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
tracked.”77  In particular, Justice Alito noted that “cell phones 
and other wireless devices now permit wireless carriers to 
track and record the location of users . . . .”78  Justice Alito 
concluded that, instead of the majority opinion’s trespass test, 
the defining question should be “whether the use of GPS 
tracking in a particular case involved a degree of intrusion 
that a reasonable person would not have anticipated.”79 
5. Cell Phones: Riley v. California 
Another important case is Riley v. California.80  While 
Riley, like Jones, has no direct bearing on the CSLI/Stingray 
debate, it illustrates how the Supreme Court views Fourth 
Amendment protections in the digital age.  In Riley, the 
defendant was arrested for possession of concealed and loaded 
firearms.81  Police searched the defendant incident to his 
arrest and seized his cell phone, which had “a broad range of 
other functions based on advanced computing capability, 
large storage capacity, and Internet connectivity.”82  
Examining the contents of the phone, police discovered 
photographs implicating the defendant in an earlier 
shooting.83  Using this evidence, the defendant was charged 
with that shooting.84 
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that such a 
search violates the Fourth Amendment.85  Even more 
relevant to this Comment is the Riley Court’s treatment of 
cell phones.  First, the Court explicitly recognized the 
importance and pervasiveness of cell phones in daily life.86  
Second, the Court recognized that cell phones could be used to 
track where an individual has been, using historic location 
information stored within the phone.87  The Court concluded 
 
 77. Id. at 962. 
 78. Id. at 963. 
 79. Id. at 964. 
 80. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
 81. Id. at 2480. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 2481. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014). 
 86. Id. at 2484. (“[Cell phones] are now such a pervasive and insistent part 
of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an 
important feature of human anatomy.”). 
 87. Id. at 2490. (“Data on a cell phone can also reveal where a person has 
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that because a cell phone contains such a density of 
information, a warrant is required to search one even if the 
search occurs incident to the owner’s arrest.88 
C. Differing Treatment of CSLI in the Circuit Courts 
As of September 2015, no appellate level court has 
addressed the use of Stingray devices.  However, the use of 
CSLI for traditional cell-site tracking has been addressed, 
and is relevant to the debate over the use of Stingrays.  
Currently, the two most prominent and recent cases have 
been from the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits..89 
1. United States v. Skinner 
The Sixth Circuit examined the use of CSLI in United 
States v. Skinner.90  Skinner involved police using CSLI to 
track and intercept the defendant, as he transported drugs 
between Arizona and Tennessee.91  Police obtained an order 
authorizing Skinner’s phone company to release his 
subscriber information, cell-site information, and GPS 
information.92  This allowed police to track Skinner’s location 
as he traveled along interstate highways.93  Police used this 
data to locate Skinner’s motorhome in a Texas truck stop.94  
After searching the motorhome, police discovered 1,100 
pounds of marijuana.95 
 
been. Historic location information is a standard feature on many smart phones 
and can reconstruct someone’s specific movements down to the minute, not only 
around town but also within a particular building.”). 
 88. Id. at 2493. 
 89. These cases are not the only federal appellate level cases to deal with 
CSLI and cell site tracking.  See, e.g., In re United States for an Order Directing 
Provider of Elec. Commun. Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304 
(3d Cir. 2010) (holding that CSLI does not automatically implicate the Fourth 
Amendment); See also In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell 
Site Data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that requiring specific 
articulable facts for CSLI did not violate the Fourth Amendment).  However, 
the cases discussed in this Comment have had the opportunity to review CSLI 
in light of the Jones decision, and are more relevant to the scope of this 
Comment. 
 90. 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 91. Id. at 776. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 776 (6th Cir. 2012). 
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The Sixth Circuit held that police use of Skinner’s CSLI 
to track his movements along public highways did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment.96  Citing Knotts, the court held that 
because the CSLI revealed only public information, i.e. 
Skinner’s location along public highways, Skinner had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in this information.97 
The court also compared the case to Karo.  The court 
reasoned that, just as the defendant in Karo received the 
barrel with the tracking device included, Skinner had 
obtained the cell phone with GPS technology included.98  
Thus, he could not object to its use by police.99 
Finally, the court distinguished the case from Jones, 
concluding that because no physical trespass occurred, Jones 
did not apply.100  Interestingly, the court cited to Justice 
Sotomayor’s concurrence, in which she opined that the digital 
age has outpaced the third party doctrine and the Knotts/
Karo public/private distinction:101 the same doctrines relied 
on by the Sixth Circuit in deciding Skinner. The court also 
discussed Justice Alito’s concurrence in Jones.102  The court 
seemingly accepted the notion that the extent of surveillance 
can have a bearing on whether or not that surveillance is 
constitutional.103  However, the court concluded that this 
concern did not apply. Comparing the twenty-eight days of 
surveillance in Jones with the three days of surveillance of 
Skinner, the court concluded that “[n]o such extreme 
comprehensive tracking is present in this case.”104 
 
 96. Id. at 778. 
 97. Id. (“There is no inherent constitutional difference between trailing a 
defendant and tracking him via such technology.”). 
 98. Id. at 781. 
 99. Id. 
 100. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 780 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Jones does 
not apply to Skinner’s case because, as Justice Sotomayor stated in her 
concurrence, ‘the majority opinion’s trespassory test’ provides little guidance on 
‘cases of electronic or other novel modes of surveillance that do not depend upon 
a physical invasion on property.’ ” (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 
945, 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)). 
 101. See discussion infra Part II.B.4. 
 102. Skinner, 690 F.3d at 780. 
 103. Id. (“There may be situations where police, using otherwise legal 
methods, so comprehensively track a person’s activities that the very 
comprehensiveness of the tracking is unreasonable for Fourth Amendment 
purposes.”). 
 104. Id. 
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Ultimately the Sixth Circuit held that because Skinner 
voluntarily accepted a phone with GPS capabilities, and 
traveled along public roads, the police making use of CLSI to 
track him was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.105 
2. United States v. Davis 
United States v. Davis106 provides an alternate view.107  
In Davis, the defendant, was convicted on several counts of 
armed robbery.108  At trial, the prosecution introduced records 
from cell phone service providers that Davis “had placed and 
received cell phone calls in close proximity to the locations of 
each of the charged robberies around the time that the 
robberies were committed . . . .”109  Because this information 
was obtained without a warrant,110 Davis argued on appeal 
that the information violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights.111 
The Eleventh Circuit held that CSLI “is within [a] 
subscriber’s reasonable expectation of privacy.”112  The court 
began by discussing Jones.113  Unlike the court in Skinner, 
the Eleventh Circuit held that Jones implicitly endorsed the 
application of the privacy theory to electronic information.114  
The court then determined that unlike GPS data gathered on 
a public highway, CSLI is more private in nature, whether or 
not its collection creates a sufficient “mosaic” to expose that 
 
 105. Skinner, 690 F.3d at 777. 
 106. United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 107. The Davis decision has since been vacated pending a rehearing en banc. 
Yet while not binding authority, it is useful in providing an alternative view of 
how courts treat CSLI. 
 108. Davis, 754 F.3d at 1209. 
 109. Id. at 1209–10. 
 110. Id. at 1210.  The information was obtained pursuant to the SCA, 
specifically, U.S.C.A. § 2703 (d), which requires only an offer of “specific and 
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the 
contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other 
information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal 
investigation.” See  discussion infra Part II.2.a. 
 111. United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1210 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 112. Id. at 1217. 
 113. Id. at 1213. 
 114. See id. (“In light of the confluence of the three opinions in the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Jones, we accept the proposition that the privacy theory is 
not only alive and well, but available to govern electronic information of search 
and seizure in the absence of trespass.”). 
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which otherwise would be private.115 
The Eleventh Circuit also rejected the argument that 
disclosure of CSLI is inherently voluntary, and thus, 
unprotected under Maryland v. Smith.116  The court conceded 
that in placing a call, a subscriber voluntarily discloses the 
number that is called.117  However, it is unlikely that most 
subscribers realize that they are also disclosing their location, 
making such disclosure involuntary.118  Further, a subscriber 
who merely answers a call has not voluntarily disclosed any 
information.119  Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held that a 
reasonable expectation of privacy exists in one’s CSLI.120 
D. Stingray Devices and Their Place in the Current Legal 
Framework 
1. Definition and Workings 
Stingrays121 (the name derives from a popular 
manufacturer of the device), also known as cell site 
simulators or International Mobile Subscription Identity 
(IMSI) Catchers, take advantage of the same underlying 
features of cell phones as traditional cell site tracking.122  
 
 115. Id. at 1216. (“One’s cell phone, unlike an automobile, can accompany its 
owner anywhere. Thus, the exposure of the cell site location information can 
convert what would otherwise be a private event into a public one.  When one’s 
whereabouts are not public, then one may have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in those whereabouts.  Therefore, while it may be the case that even in 
light of the Jones opinion, GPS location information on an automobile would be 
protected only in the case of aggregated data, even one point of cell site location 
data can be within a reasonable expectation of privacy.”). 
 116. United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1216–17 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 117. Id. at 1217. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 1215. However, the court did not exclude evidence gathered by the 
Stingray, because the officers had acted in good faith reliance on a court order 
and thus, the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule applied.  See Davis, 
754 F.3d at 1217–18 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)). 
 121. Devlin Barrett, American’s Cell Phones Targeted in Secret U.S. Spy 
Program, WALL STREET JOURNAL, (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
americans-cellphones-targeted-in-secret-u-s-spy-program-1415917533. 
 122. U.S. Department of Justice, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MANUAL 38-40 
(2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/foia/docs/elec-sur-manual
.pdf.  This manual is dated, and its procedural aspects cannot be relied upon as 
the law has changed.  Despite this, it is still useful in detailing the underlying 
operation of the Stingray device. 
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Stingrays operate by imitating a cell tower.123  To a cell 
phone, the Stingray appears to have the strongest and 
nearest signal, compelling the phone to register with the 
device.124  When registering, the phone sends location 
information, as well as identifying information such as the 
ESN and the MIN.125 
Using data that a target phone sends when it registers, 
the phone’s location can be revealed.126  The government has 
closely guarded information about its use Stingrays, so it is 
difficult to determine exactly how accurate they are.127  
Evidence of how Stingrays are being used has led some to 
estimate that the device is comparably accurate, and perhaps 
more so, than traditional cell site tracking.128 
Not only can a Stingray track a target phone, but because 
it acquires data directly from the phone, it can be used to 
identify that phone’s number as well.129  In addition, 
Stingrays can intercept the contents of a call,130 but because 
this almost certainly falls under the Fourth Amendment as a 
wiretap, police must configure the device to disable this 
capability.131  In effect, the Stingray combines the features of 
many surveillance tools into one package.  It is capable of: (1) 
acquiring CSLI and tracking the location of a phone in real 
time132; (2) identifying a target’s phone number;133 and (3) 
obtaining outgoing and incoming call information like a Pen/
 
 123. See Barrett, supra note 121. 
 124. See Barrett, supra note 121; See also U.S. Department of Justice, supra 
note 122, at 40 (stating that Stingrays will “electronically force a cellular 
telephone to register [with the device]. . .”). 
 125. U.S. Department of Justice, supra note 122, at 40. 
 126. U.S. Department of Justice, supra note 122, at 40. 
 127. For example, in a notable case in Florida, during appeal it was revealed 
that police used the Stingray device around 200 times without disclosing this to 
the court.  Police claimed that a non-disclosure agreement signed with the 
manufacturer prevented them from disclosing their use of the device, even to 
the court.  See Kim Zetter, Florida Cops Secret Weapon: Warrantless Cell Phone 
Tracking, WIRED,, (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/03/stingray/. 
 128. Curtiss, supra note 5, at 166. 
 129. U.S. Department of Justice, supra note 122, at 40.  This is unlike 
traditional cell site tracking, where advance knowledge of the target phone 
number is needed before CSLI can be acquired from cell providers. 
 130. U.S. Department of Justice, supra note 122, at 41. 
 131. U.S. Department of Justice, supra note 122, at 41. 
 132. U.S. Department of Justice, supra note 122, at 40. 
 133. U.S. Department of Justice, supra note 122, at 40. 
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Trap device.134  Further, it acquires this information directly, 
so cell service providers do not need to be compelled to 
cooperate.135 
Unsurprisingly for such a useful device, use of Stingrays 
is reportedly on the rise: police can use vehicles and planes136 
to transport the device, creating a highly mobile surveillance 
tool.  Yet details about the device are scarce, not least because 
of the government’s secrecy surrounding the device.137 
2. Statutory Authority for use of the Stingray 
The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001138 revised the Pen/Trap 
statute to include “signaling information,” which the 
Department of Justice construes as permitting the collection 
of cell phone registration “pings.”139  Thus, generally the 
government will seek a pen/trap order before using the 
device.140  However, many of these orders are under seal, and 
it is unclear what level of specificity police are using when 
obtaining a court order to use a Stingray, and in some cases it 
seems unlikely that the court has been made fully aware of 
the scope of an order that police are seeking.141  For example, 
in Tacoma, Washington, superior court judges unwittingly 
 
 134. U.S. Department of Justice, supra note 122, at 39–40. 
 135. U.S. Department of Justice, supra note 122, at 41. 
 136. See Jon Campbell, LAPD Spied on 21 Using StingRay Anti-Terrorism 
Tool, LA WEEKLY NEWS, http://www.laweekly.com/news/lapd-spied-on-21-
using-stingray-anti-terrorism-tool-2612739, (discussing LAPD use of the 
Stingray over four-month period); See also Barrett, supra note 121 (discussing 
Department of Justice use of a Stingray-like device attached to a small fixed 
wing aircraft and then flown above urban areas). 
 137. See Justin Fenton, Judge threatens detective with contempt for declining 
to reveal cellphone tracking methods, THE BALTIMOR SUN, http://www.
baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-stingray-officer-
contempt-20141117-story.html (discussing prosecutors abandoning evidence 
rather than reveal details about how or if the Stingray device was used in 
locating a suspect). 
 138. UNITING AND STRENGTHENING AMERICA BY PROVIDING APPROPRIATE 
TOOLS REQUIRED TO INTERCEPT AND OBSTRUCT TERRORISM (USA PATRIOT ACT) 
ACT OF 2001, 107 P.L. 56, 115 Stat. 272. 
 139. See Curtiss, supra note 5, at 167; See also U.S. Department of Justice, 
supra note 122, at 41. 
 140. U.S. Department of Justice, supra note 122, at 41–48. 
 141. See e.g., Barrett, supra note 121 (“Christopher Soghoian, chief 
technologist at the American Civil Liberties Union, called it ‘a dragnet 
surveillance program. It’s inexcusable and it’s likely—to the extent judges are 
authorizing it—[that] they have no idea of the scale of it.’ ”  (emphasis added)). 
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signed over 170 pen/trap orders that police used as 
authorization to use a Stingray.142  The judges first learned 
that they were authorizing the use of a Stingray device in 
those orders when a newspaper reported on it.143 
Recently, it appears that the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation has enacted a policy that requires a warrant to 
be obtained before a Stingray is used.144  However, the FBI 
leaves a broad exception for use of the device in public 
areas145 and in any event local police departments are not 
bound by the policies of the FBI. 
II. IDENTIFICATION OF LEGAL PROBLEM  
Applying the Fourth Amendment to the use of Stingrays 
is far from the neatest solution.  For one, there is a complete 
lack of any direct precedent involving Stingrays.  The nearest 
analogy comes in the form of cases involving CSLI acquired 
under the SCA or Pen/Trap statutes, and even then, judicial 
treatment of CSLI is muddled.146 
Further, the use of Stingrays is likely an issue best 
suited for the legislature.147  This is complicated, however, by 
the fact that the government closely guards any information 
about the Stingray device.148  Recently, at least two Senators 
 
 142. Adam Lynn, Tacoma police change how they seek permission to use 
cellphone tracker, THE NEWS TRIBUNE (Nov. 15, 2014), http://www.thenews
tribune.com/news/local/crime/article25894096.html. 
 143. Id. 
 144. This policy was revealed by FBI officials in private briefings with staff of 
Senators Chuck Grassley and Patrick Leahy, after the Senators sought 
information regarding the use of Stingrays.  Leahy and Grassley Press 
Administration on Use of Cell Phone Tracking Program, (12/31/2014), 
http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/leahy-grassley-press-
administration-use-cell-phone-tracking-program. 
 145. Id.  “For example, we understand that the FBI’s new policy requires FBI 
agents to obtain a search warrant whenever a cell-site simulator is used as part 
of a FBI investigation or operation, unless one of several exceptions apply, 
including (among others): (1) cases that pose an imminent danger to public 
safety, (2) cases that involve a fugitive, or (3) cases in which the technology is 
used in public places or other locations at which the FBI deems there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy.” 
 146. See infra Part I.C. 
 147. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., 
concurring) (“In circumstances involving dramatic technological change, the 
best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative.”). 
 148. See Fenton, supra note 137; See also Lynn, supra note 142. 
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have taken an interest in the device and questioned law 
enforcement officials on its use, but it is unclear where this 
will lead.149 
Currently, the government’s ability to use the Stingray 
device is only constrained by having to seek a pen/trap order, 
which might not provide sufficient protection.150  Further, 
using a pen/trap order as sufficient for both CSLI and 
Stingrays ignores the inherent differences between the two 
tracking methods.151  Because police do not have to work with 
cell service providers to acquire information, the SCA does 
not apply.152  The general lack of awareness of the Stingray in 
the media and the public, along with the government’s 
secrecy regarding the device, makes it unlikely that any 
uniform legislative guidance will arise soon.  Therefore, if the 
use of Stingrays is to be effectively governed, it must fall on 
the judiciary to determine if such use violates the Fourth 
Amendment. 
III. ANALYSIS  
A. Applicability of Current CSLI Analysis to Stingrays 
Even if Skinner and Davis gave definitive rules on CSLI, 
both cases dealt with law enforcement acquiring CSLI from 
cell service providers, pursuant to a court order.153  The use of 
Stingrays is quite different, as the CSLI is acquired directly 
from the subscriber, without having to involve the cell service 
provider.154  Thus, the same arguments regarding whether 
Fourth Amendment protection exists for CSLI should not be 
used to analyze devices like the Stingray. 
1. Third Party Doctrine 
One argument against there being a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the context of traditional cell site 
 
 149. See Leahy and Grassley Press Administration on Use of Cell Phone 
Tracking Program, supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 150. See Lynn, supra note 142. 
 151. See discussion infra Part III. 
 152. See discussion Part III.A.1. 
 153. See United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1210 (11th Cir. 2014); See 
also United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 776 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 154. U.S. Department of Justice, supra note 122, at 41. 
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tracking is that a subscriber who places a call on a cell phone 
is voluntarily disclosing his CSLI to the cell provider, thus 
waiving his Fourth Amendment protection.155  This argument 
is generally based on the third-party doctrine, proposing that 
an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information that is voluntarily disclosed to a third party.156  
The strongest example comes from Smith v. Maryland,157 
where the Supreme Court held that no reasonable 
expectation of privacy exists in a telephone number that is 
voluntarily conveyed to the a phone company to make a 
call.158  The principle of the doctrine is that one who 
voluntarily discloses otherwise protected information to a 
third party voluntarily assumes the risk that the information 
will become unprotected or public.159  In the context of CLSI, 
some courts have held that a user no longer has an 
expectation of privacy in his location information once it is 
disclosed to cell service providers.160 
This argument simply does not apply to the use of a 
Stingray.  While cell phones do convey information to third-
party service providers, this is not the information that 
Stingrays collect.161  Stingrays acquire data directly from the 
target phone, circumventing the cell service provider and 
eliminating the third party altogether.162  Therefore, when 
discussing the use of a Stingray, the argument that a cell 
phone user has disclosed information to a third-party is 
defeated by the fact that no third-party is involved. 
Further, the notion that a cell phone user assumes the 
risk of third party disclosure of his location information does 
not apply to Stingrays.  By design, Stingrays are far more 
proactive than cell site tracking.  The DOJ manual speaks of 
“forcing” the target phone to register with the device as the 
 
 155. See, e.g., United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d at 778. 
 156. See discussion infra Part II.B.3. 
 157. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 158. Id. at 745–46. 
 159. See discussion supra Part II.B.3. 
 160. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d at 778 (“Similar reasoning [as Smith 
v. Maryland] compels the conclusion here that Skinner did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the location of his cell phone while 
traveling on public thoroughfares.”). 
 161. U.S. Department of Justice, supra note 122, at 40–41. 
 162. U.S. Department of Justice, supra note 122, at 41. 
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phone believes it to be a genuine cell tower.163  Cell phones 
automatically transmit CSLI to the Stingray, without any 
action from the user164 (aside from possessing a phone and 
having it switched on).  Thus, rather than passively collecting 
data as it is turned over to a third party, Stingrays actively 
force users to reveal information.165  In such a situation there 
is no assumption of the risk on the part of the user, and so the 
third party doctrine does not apply to the use of a Stingray. 
2. Knotts/Karo 
The Knotts/Karo analysis, inquiring into whether a 
search penetrated into the private sphere, is often discussed 
in cases involving cell phone tracking.166  Proponents of this 
view assert that tracking an individual’s movements in 
public, where he could be visually tracked by law enforcement 
without a warrant, does not penetrate into the private 
sphere.167  This argument has been criticized in the context of 
cell site tracking, because cell site tracking is far more 
accurate than the tracking devices in Knotts and Karo.168  The 
same argument is even stronger applied to Stingrays. 
First, there is evidence that Stingrays are at least as 
accurate, if not more so, than traditional cell site tracking.169  
Further, as the underlying technology continues to improve, 
Stingrays will only become more accurate.  Where an 
individual can be tracked so precisely, there is a far greater 
 
 163. U.S. Department of Justice, supra note 122, at 40 (A cell site 
simulator . . . can electronically force a cellular telephone to register [with the 
device].” (emphasis added)). 
 164. U.S. Department of Justice, supra note 122, at 40–41 (“The necessary 
signaling data (ESN/MIN,channel/cell site codes) are not dialed or otherwise 
controlled by the cellular telephone user.  Rather, the transmission of the 
cellular telephone’s ESN/MIN to the nearest cell site occurs automatically when 
the cellular telephone is turned on.”). 
 165. U.S. Department of Justice, supra note 122, at 40–41. 
 166. See, e.g., United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d at 777. 
 167. See id. at 778 (holding that “[w]hile the cell site information aided the 
police in determining Skinner’s location, that same information could have been 
obtained through visual surveillance.”). 
 168. See Curtiss, supra note 5, at 173; See also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 
2473, 2490 (2014) (“Data on a cell phone can also reveal where a person has 
been.  Historic location information is a standard feature on many smart phones 
and can reconstruct someone’s specific movements down to the minute, not only 
around town but also within a particular building.”). 
 169. See Curtiss, supra note 5, at 166. 
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risk that the use of a Stingray will penetrate into the private 
sphere.170 
Beyond the increased accuracy of the devices, the analogy 
to visual surveillance in public that Knotts/Karo relies on is 
an inaccurate portrayal of how Stingray devices work.  
Stingrays simply function differently than the tracker used in 
Knotts.  Rather than simply tracking a specific target, a 
Stingray can both find the target phone and force it to reveal 
its location.171  This is more intrusive than merely following 
an individual on a public road, in the sense that a Stingray 
not only tracks a targets location but can identify a target as 
well.  Thus, the analogy to visual surveillance in public is not 
accurate. 
3. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
Following the Katz v. United States decision,172 the 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test has become a central 
inquiry into Fourth Amendment issues.173  The basic rule is 
that the Fourth Amendment applies if an individual had a 
subjective expectation of privacy in a location or situation, 
and if society as a whole recognizes that expectation as 
objectively reasonable.174  This rule was expanded on in Kyllo 
v. United States,175where the Court examined the use of 
thermal imaging technology to monitor a private residence.  
The Court held that society’s objective understanding of what 
is reasonable was shaped by the fact that thermal imaging 
technology was not in general public use.176 
The Kyllo analysis is particularly relevant when 
analyzing use of the Stingray.  Stingrays are not in general 
public use,177 and are not within society’s reasonable 
expectations.  It has been argued that with the growing use of 
smart phones and location-based technology, the average user 
 
 170. See Curtiss, supra note 5, at 173. 
 171. U.S. Department of Justice, supra note 122, at 40. 
 172. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 173. See discussion supra Part.II.B.3. 
 174. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J. concurring) (1967). 
 175. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 176. Id. at 40. 
 177. Just as with the thermal imaging technology in Kyllo, the inquiry is not 
actually focused on raw usage of the device, but whether the public generally 
knows of the device.  See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. 
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knows that cell phones innately convey location 
information.178  Even so, the specifics of how Stingrays work 
are not general knowledge to either the media or the general 
public.179  In fact, the government has been notably tight-
lipped about disclosing any details about its use of Stingray 
devices or about how the devices function.180  Given this, 
Stingrays could be seen as outside society’s reasonable 
expectations. 
This view is reinforced with the recent decisions of Jones 
and Riley.  In her concurrence in Jones, Justice Sotomayor 
questioned “whether people reasonably expect that their 
movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that 
enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, 
their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so 
on.”181  Though Jones involved a GPS tracking device,182 
Justice Sotomayor’s concern is even more relevant to the use 
of Stingrays.  Unlike a GPS unit attached to a car, a Stingray 
can track an individual wherever he goes, even within a 
particular room of a building, so long as he has his cellular 
phone with him.183  Thus, even if people might have a general 
 
 178. See Orin Kerr, Cell Phones, Magic Boxes and the Fourth Amendment, 
THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 8, 2010, 6:05 
PM), http://volokh.com/2010/11/08/cell-phones-magic-boxes-and-the-fourth-
amendment/ ; See also United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 781 (6th Cir. 
2012) (holding that Skinner knew his phone was GPS enabled when he obtained 
it and thus did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his location 
information). 
 179. Only recently, with a spate of public records requests, has the use of the 
device been under real scrutiny from the public.  See Hanni Fakhoury, 
Stingrays Go Mainstream: 2014 in Review, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUNDATION, (Jan. 2, 2015), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/01/2014-review-
stingrays-go-mainstream. 
 180. See Fenton, supra note 137; See also Lynn, supra note 142. 
 181. United States v. Jones 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). 
 182. Id. at 948. 
 183. Courts have recognized that the increased role cell phones play in 
people’s lives increases the concerns surrounding their privacy.  See Riley v. 
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014) (noting that cell phones and their users 
are rarely apart: “Prior to the digital age, people did not typically carry a cache 
of sensitive personal information with them as they went about their day.  Now 
it is the person who is not carrying a cell phone, with all that it contains, who is 
the exception.  According to one poll, nearly three-quarters of smart phone users 
report being within five feet of their phones most of the time, with 12% 
admitting that they even use their phones in the shower.”); See also United 
States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1216 (11th Cir. 2014) (“One’s cell phone, unlike 
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idea about how GPS technology could track them, it is 
unlikely that they understand that a cell phone (which 
typically accompanies a person everywhere he goes)184 could 
be used to record their every movement. 
Even more illuminating is the Court’s opinion in Riley v. 
California.185  There, the Court determined that a warrant is 
required to search an individual’s cell phone incident to his 
arrest.186  One of the bases for the Court’s opinion was that 
cell phones contain location information that can reconstruct 
an individual’s movements with great precision.187  This 
indicates the Court’s recognition that CSLI is within an 
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy, and thus, 
should be protected by the Fourth Amendment.  There is no 
compelling reason why this protection would apply to location 
information obtained in a search of a cell phone incident to its 
owner’s arrest, but would not apply to the use of a Stingray to 
force that same phone to reveal the same information.  In 
fact, because a person has somewhat less Fourth Amendment 
protection from a search incident to arrest,188 there is an even 
stronger argument that the Court’s reasoning in Riley 
extends Fourth Amendment protection to location 
information acquired by a Stingray.  In light of the Riley 
decision, courts should be more inclined to require a warrant 
before allowing the use of a Stingray device to acquire 
location information. 
4. Other Concerns 
Stingrays also raise several Fourth Amendment concerns 
that are unique to the device.  As Justice Sotomayor noted in 
Jones, law enforcement surveillance techniques that are 
relatively cheap, simple, and covert have a greater potential 
of being used by law enforcement in ways that violate 
constitutional rights.189  This analysis would also apply to the 
 
an automobile, can accompany its owner anywhere.”). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
 186. Id. at 2493. 
 187. Id. at 2490. 
 188. Id. at 2482. (“[I]t has been well accepted that such a search constitutes 
an exception to the warrant requirement.”) 
 189. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). (“[B]ecause GPS monitoring is cheap in comparison to conventional 
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use of Stingrays, which is shrouded in secrecy from the 
public, and is uncomplicated compared to working with or 
compelling a cell service provider to obtain CSLI.  This is 
further aggravated by the government’s reticence concerning 
the device.190  Simply put, it is difficult to determine whether 
Stingrays are being used in ways that violate the Fourth 
Amendment when the government will scarcely admit that 
they are being used at all.191  Even if law enforcement can be 
trusted to show restraint when using the device, the fact 
remains that exercising such restraint should not be left to 
the discretion of law enforcement.192 
Judicial oversight of the use of Stingrays is especially 
important in light of the fact that a Stingray does not 
discriminate amongst which phones it forces to register.193  By 
their operation, Stingrays masquerade as a cell tower, forcing 
all cell phones in proximity to register with the device, 
revealing their location information.194  This means Stingrays 
invariably collect the location information of non-target 
phones as well as that of its target.195  In fact, certain reports 
have stated that police may now be using specialized 
Stingray-like devices that are attached to small planes, which 
are flown along a certain path.196  This collects a massive 
amount of “incidental” location information.197  Reportedly, 
police delete this information and do not store it.198  But the 
 
surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the 
ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement practices: ‘limited 
police resources and community hostility.’ ”  (quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 
419, 426 (2004)). 
 190. See Fenton, supra note 137; See also Lynn, supra note 142. 
 191. See Fenton, supra note 137; See also Lynn, supra note 142. 
 192. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356–57 (1967) (“It is apparent 
that the agents in this case acted with restraint.  Yet the inescapable fact is 
that this restraint was imposed by the agents themselves, not by a judicial 
officer . . . [T]his Court has never sustained a search upon the sole ground that 
officers reasonably expected to find evidence of a particular crime and 
voluntarily confined their activities to the least intrusive means consistent with 
that end.”).  
 193. See Barrett, supra note 121. 
 194. See Barrett, supra note 121. 
 195. See Barrett, supra note 121. 
 196. See Barrett, supra note 121. 
 197. See Barrett, supra note 121. 
 198. See Barrett, supra note 121. 
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police’s lack of transparency about the use of the device,199 
and the lack of judicial oversight this leads to,200 again leads 
to a situation where the only guard against constitutional 
violations is an officer’s restraint.201 
The lack of clear rules has another cost.  Even if the use 
of a Stingray device is found to violate the Fourth 
Amendment, a court might allow evidence gathered by its use 
under the “good faith exception” to the exclusionary rule.202  
In Davis, the court found that police had violated Davis’ 
Fourth Amendment rights in acquiring his CSLI without a 
warrant.203  But because police obtained the information 
pursuant to the SCA, the court held that it could be admitted 
under a good faith exception, as police relied in good faith on 
a court order.204  The same argument could be made for 
Stingrays, even if, as with the case in Tacoma, an application 
for an order did not make it clear that a Stingray was being 
used.205 
IV. PROPOSAL 
The Stingray has outpaced even the statutes that allow 
collection of CSLI from cell phone providers.  Collection of 
CSLI by Stingrays involves no component of voluntary 
disclosure, one of the main rationales for allowing police to 
collect CSLI on a lesser showing than probable cause.206  
Additionally, Stingrays are not only used to track target 
phones but also to identify the phone, and are precise enough 
to determine a phone’s location within a few meters.207  This 
makes the public/private distinction of Knotts/Karo less 
 
 199. See Fenton, supra note 137; See also Lynn, supra note 142. 
 200. See Lynn, supra note 142.  Judges in this case would not have been able 
to effectively rein in police abuse, because they were unaware of the methods 
police were using. 
 201. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356–57 (1967). 
 202. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1217–18 (11th Cir. 
2014) (holding that because police relied in good faith on a court order, the 
evidence gathered by their search should not be excluded, even where the 
search was unconstitutional). 
 203.  Id. at 1217. 
 204.  Id. 
 205.  See Lynn, supra note 142. 
 206.  See discussion infra Part IV.A.1. 
 207.  See discussion infra Part IV.A.2. 
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relevant in the context of Stingrays.208  Perhaps most 
troubling is the higher potential a Stingray has to violate the 
privacy not only of a target of surveillance, but of any cell 
phone users in its vicinity.209  Because of the differences 
between Stingrays and cell site tracking, this Comment 
proposes that the use of Stingrays should not be governed by 
a lesser showing than probable cause, as cell site tracking is.  
Instead, a warrant should be required before a Stingray can 
be deployed. 
A warrant requirement would largely mitigate the risks 
of Stringray abuse.  By requiring a warrant, judges can 
ensure that they are more informed about the specifics of how 
the device will be deployed, avoiding situations where a judge 
grants an order authorizing what he believes is traditional 
cell site tracking, but in reality is interpreted by police as 
Stringray authorization.210 
Requiring a warrant would introduce an element of 
judicial oversight into the use of the Stingray.  Judges could 
demand that precautions be taken to avoid storing the data of 
non-target phones and ensure that police have a process in 
place for deleting this data.  This would serve to curb 
potential abuse of the Stingray.211  Further, having an 
element of judicial oversight might ease the concerns of those 
who believe the Stingray is being used too broadly.212 
This comment is mindful of the fact that a warrant 
requirement inevitably hinders law enforcement’s ability to 
combat crime.213  In the midst of privacy concerns, it must be 
remembered that the Stingray, and cell site tracking in 
general, are incredibly useful tools for law enforcement to 
solve crimes quickly and prevent other crimes from occurring 
at all.214  In events involving kidnappings or missing persons, 
 
 208.  See discussion infra Part IV.A.2. 
 209.  See discussion infra Part IV.A.4. 
 210.  See, e.g., Lynn, supra note 142. 
 211.  See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., 
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 212.  See, e.g., supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 213.  See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014) (“We cannot deny 
that our decision today will have an impact on the ability of law enforcement to 
combat crime . . . [p]rivacy has a cost.”). 
 214. See In re United States for Order for Prospective Cell Site Location 
Info., 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
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where time is of the essence, the Stingray can save lives.215  It 
has been argued that the process of a warrant significantly 
hinders rapid police response to time-sensitive crises.216 
Riley recognized that a warrant requirement will hinder 
law enforcement’s efforts.217  Yet it also recognized that “the 
warrant requirement is ‘an important working part of our 
machinery of government,’ not merely ‘an inconvenience to be 
somehow “weighed” against the claims of police efficiency.’ ” 218  
Further, the Court noted that exceptions to a warrant 
requirement exist where “exigencies of the situations” will 
justify a warrantless search, including “the need to prevent 
the imminent destruction of evidence in individual cases, to 
pursue a fleeing suspect, and to assist persons who are 
seriously injured or are threatened with imminent injury.”219  
The emergency exception is well established,220 and would 
encompass time-sensitive situations such as kidnappings and 
missing persons.  Fears that attaching a warrant requirement 
to a Stingray would stifle law enforcement response during 
these critical times are overstated. 
The requirement of a warrant protects the privacy of a 
cell phone user in his movements without overly burdening 
the needs of police to gather information and respond to 
crises.  Additionally, requiring a warrant provides a clear 
standard to follow when using a Stingray: courts will not need 
to speculate as to exactly what length of surveillance 
implicates the Fourth Amendment, or whether the 
surveillance intruded into the private sphere. 
CONCLUSION 
Stingrays reveal more information than traditional cell 
site tracking, are simpler to deploy, and may ensnare non-
target’s phone data as easily as that of a target.  With such 
serious privacy concerns, the minimal protection of a Pen/
Trap order is not sufficient.  The SCA does not apply to the 
use of a Stingray because Stingrays bypass the need to 
 
 215. See Curtiss, supra note 5, at 145. 
 216. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494. 
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 219. Id. at 2494. 
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acquire stored communications. 
In the absence of decisive legislative action, the only 
viable protection from the overreach of the Stingray device is 
the Fourth Amendment.  The recent decisions of Jones and 
Riley provide a sturdy legal basis for the argument that the 
use of a Stingray device to intercept CLSI requires probable 
cause, rather than a lesser standard.  Courts should look to 
these cases in extending Fourth Amendment protection 
against use of the Stingray device. 
 
